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1019 
STRICT LIABILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS?  
THE IMPACT OF 3-D PRINTING ON  
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although a relatively new technology, three-dimensional (“3-D”) 
printing has been pronounced an invention with “the potential to 
revolutionize the way we make almost everything.”1 Worldwide shipments 
of 3-D printers are expected to surge from roughly 100,000 units in 2014 
to over 2.3 million units by 2018.
2
 Consumer-sector growth follows 
significant media attention to the widespread uses of 3-D printing in the 
commercial realm. For example, the makers of the latest James Bond 
movie, Skyfall, used an industrial 3-D printer to create 1:3 scale replicas of 
an Aston Martin for an action scene.
3
 3-D printing has been used by 
medical researchers to design highly customized life-saving implants for 
patients.
4
 NASA sent a 3-D printer to the International Space Station in 
 
 
 1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available at 
the White House website: Office of the Press Secretary, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address, archived at http://perma.cc/KES9-
7KBX). 
 2. Press Release, Gartner Inc., Gartner Says Worldwide Shipments of 3D Printers to Reach 
More than 217,000 in 2015 (Oct. 27, 2014) (available at http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/ 
2887417, archived at http://perma.cc/2SNG-WXKW) (noting that “the 3D printer market is at an 
inflection point”); see also Press Release, Gartner Inc., Gartner Says Worldwide Shipments of 3D 
Printers to Grow 49 Percent in 2013 (Oct. 2, 2013) (available at http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/ 
id/2600115, archived at http://perma.cc/UV7X-77NP); John Greenough, The 3D-Printer Industry Is 
Taking Shape, with Big Implications for Product Design, Manufacturing, and Marketing, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/3d-printers-could-create-a-new-
marketplace-for-entrepeneurs-2015-1, archived at http://perma.cc/5QUT-F4PX. 
 3. Mark Hearn, Voxeljet 3D Printer Used to Produce Skyfall’s Aston Martin Stunt Double, 
ENGADGET (Nov. 12, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/11/12/voxeljet-3d-printer-
skyfalls-aston-martin-stunt-double, archived at http://perma.cc/BL3F-TGRJ. 
 4. In 2011, researchers at the University of Michigan designed a 3-D printed splint to treat 
patients with tracheobronchomalacia, a condition where the windpipe is too weak and collapses, 
preventing the flow of oxygen. The researchers got emergency FDA approval for this splint and were 
able to save the life of a six-week old boy by implanting a custom-sized splint around his windpipe. 
Using a 3-D printer, this sort of splint can be made in less than twenty-four hours. Rachael Rettner, 
Baby’s Life Saved with 3D Printing, LIVESCIENCE (May 22, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.livescience. 
com/34613-3d-printing-airway-splint.html, archived at http://perma.cc/77TA-VUQM. 
 On March 4, 2013, another patient underwent a skull implant, where seventy-five percent of his 
skull was replaced using a FDA-approved 3-D printed implant. These successes open the door for 
other uses of 3-D printed implants or bone replacements. Jeremy Hsu, 3D-Printed Skull Implant Ready 
for Operation, OXFORD PERFORMANCE MATERIALS (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.oxfordpm. 
com/news/article/2013-03-06_3d-printed_skull_implant_ready_for_operation, archived at http://perma. 
cc/XKB3-QA6Y. 
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2014 to manufacture spare parts and tools.
5
 Goldman Sachs called 3-D 
printing one of eight technologies set to creatively disrupt and transform 
businesses.
6
 3-D printing has already become an extremely valuable 
technology across business fields. As the price of consumer-grade 3-D 
printers continues to decrease, and more consumers invest in this 
technology, the entire manufacturing landscape is expected to transform 
dramatically.
7
 
Despite these remarkable applications, 3-D printing technology is still a 
relatively young technology. In the mid-1950s, engineers developed inkjet 
printing using a controlled high-pressure pump to distribute ink droplets 
onto paper and replicate a digital image in high resolution.
8
 3-D printing 
technology developed in the 1980s through innovations in inkjet printing 
technology.
9
 In the 1990s, the process of 3-D printing was further refined, 
 
 
 5. Grant Lowery, Made in Space Bringing 3D Printing to Space, NRP POST, Summer 2013, at 
1, 5, available at http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/ nrppostsummer13_3.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8L8S-EWLB; see also Mike Wall, Space Station’s 3D Printer Makes 1st Part, 
SPACE.COM (Nov. 25, 2014 3:33 PM), http://www.space.com/ 27861-3d-printer-space-station-first-
part.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PM3T-7KQG. On November 24, 2014, the 3-D printer on the 
International Space Station manufactured its first part. Id. The goal of this initial phase of the project is 
to test 3-D printing technology in orbit. Id. The next phase of this project involves actual utilization of 
the 3-D printed parts. Id. On a similar but less immediate note, the European Space Agency, as well as 
several other organizations, is studying the possibility of sending 3-D printers to the Moon, where they 
could be used to print shelters using Moon-soil for potential inhabitants. Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, 
Could Future Astronauts 3D Print Habitats Using Mars and Moon Soil?, GIZMODO (Sept. 10, 2013, 
2:52 PM), 2013 WLNR 22564472. 
 6. Rob Wile, Goldman: The 8 Extraordinary Technologies Forcing Businesses to Adapt or Die, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-creative-
destruction-2013-8?op=1, archived at http://perma.cc/ECQ3-6PQQ. 
 7. VIVEK SRINIVASAN & JARROD BASSAN, CSC LEADING EDGE FORUM, 3D PRINTING AND THE 
FUTURE OF MANUFACTURING, 2–4 (2012), available at http://assets1.csc.com/innovation/downloads/ 
LEF_20123DPrinting.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 7TFW-YJQ7. The Leading Edge Forum’s Fall 
2012 report outlines several ways that 3-D printing will impact manufacturing. First, manufacturing is 
becoming democratized, meaning that the traditional barriers (financial resources and skills) 
preventing people from manufacturing their own products are being stripped away. Id. at 17–20. In 
turn, the traditional manufacturing industry may see an increase in competition. Second, 3D printing 
will also change the traditional manufacturing industry, by shrinking the timetable for getting products 
to the market, normalizing customization of products, and mitigating the price advantages associated 
with low-cost regions. Id. at 21. Third, the lines between individuals, retailers, and manufacturers will 
blur “as more organizations and individuals become manufacturers.” Id.; see also The Third Industrial 
Revolution, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21553017, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZA9G-UBTM.  
 8. Alan Hudd, Inkjet Printing Technologies, in CHEMISTRY OF INKJET INKS 3, 3 (Shlomo 
Magdassi ed., 2010). See also Drew Kaplan, Here’s Olivetti’s $499 State-of-the-Art, Dry Ink Jet, Plain 
Paper Printer, POPULAR SCIENCE, July 1984, at 22–23.  
 9. Jimmy Daly, The History of 3-D Printing, STATETECH MAGAZINE, Aug. 13, 2013, available 
at http://www.statetechmagazine.com/article/2013/08/history-3-D-printing-infographic, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EZ24-AK9N. Charles Hull, founder of 3D Systems, invented the first 3-D printer in 
1984, using a technique called stereolithography. Stereolithography is the original type of additive 
manufacturing, now known as 3-D printing. Stereolithograhic 3-D printers use UV technology to cure 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/8
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allowing these printers to manufacture complex products very quickly.
10
 
Over the last fifteen years, 3-D printing has experienced additional 
advances, such as the ability to print metal, clothing materials, and even 
chocolate, the capacity to manufacture tissues and organs, and the influx 
of affordable, personal 3-D printers.
11
  
Thus, because of its tremendous power and extensive benefits, 3-D 
printing offers several advantages over traditional manufacturing. First, it 
uses material more efficiently.
12
 In traditional manufacturing, metal and 
plastic parts are cut out from larger sheets of material, resulting in the 
waste of up to 90% of the material.
13
 However, with 3-D printing, the 
material is precisely fused together, with very little wasted.
14
 Second, 3-D 
printers are not subject to traditional manufacturing engineering 
constraints, which means that 3-D printed objects may be less clunky and 
contain less surplus material.
15
 As a result, a 3-D printed part may be 60% 
lighter but still as sturdy as its traditionally manufactured equivalent.
16
 
Finally, 3-D printing offers an inexpensive route to innovation. An 
amateur entrepreneur could print a single prototype to test and improve his 
or her invention before investing in large-scale manufacturing.
17
 As can be 
seen, 3-D printing has been used commercially for decades, primarily as a 
means to make cheap prototypes before manufacturing products on a 
 
 
liquid photopolymer, or resin. U.S. Patent No. 4,575,330 (filed Aug. 8, 1984). First, a movable 
perforated platform is lowered just below the surface of the vat of resin. The UV laser traces a cross-
section of the object onto the surface of the resin, which causes the photopolymer to harden and bond 
to the platform. Id. The platform is lowered very slightly, and the layer traces and hardens another 
layer of the resin, which sticks to the first layer because of the self-adhesive property of photopolymer. 
Id. This layering process is repeated until the object is complete. Id. 
 10. Daly, supra note 9. 
 11. Daly, supra note 9; Katherine Bayly, 3D Chocolate Printer Could Be Future of Gifts, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2011, 7:20 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8620908/3D-
chocolate-printer-could-be-future-of-gifts.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S6D2-43VD; Steve 
Hargreaves, Hershey’s to Make 3-D Chocolate Printer, CNN MONEY (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:44 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/16/technology/3d-printer-chocolate/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Y2HF-WEWN. 
 12. 3-D Printing: The Printed World, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2011, at 77–79, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18114221/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. Andy Hawkins, lead engineer on the EADS Innovation Works project, explained that with 
3-D printing “[y]ou only put material where you need to have material.” Id. In other words, because 3-
D printed objects are constructed layer by layer, it is possible to leave hollow areas, whereas a 
traditional manufacturing machine would not be able to create such a void. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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larger scale.
18
 But now, as the capabilities of 3-D printers have improved, 
they have taken on a larger role in the manufacturing of final products.
19
 
At the time of this Note’s publication, personal 3-D printers are 
available for as little as $499, or as much as $4900, depending on the 
resolution, print size, and numbers of colors in each print.
20
 Makerbot, one 
of the foremost 3-D printer manufacturers, offers a personal 3-D scanner 
for only $799 that can scan an object in approximately twelve minutes.
21
 
Websites such as Thingiverse serve as a marketplace for 3-D designs, 
while other websites allow users to upload their own design that it will 
print and ship to them.
22
 In July 2013, eBay released an iPhone application 
that allows consumers to buy and customize 3-D printed merchandise.
23
 
The increasing affordability of 3-D printers also makes it more profitable 
for retailers to carry 3-D printers. Staples already sells 3-D printers in its 
stores, and Gartner Consulting projects that seven of the largest fifty 
multinational retailers will do so by 2015.
24
 Even Amazon has created a 
 
 
 18. Id. More recently, as 3-D printing has become more affordable, small businesses have 
similarly begun to use 3-D printers to print prototypes. Karen E. Klein, How 3D Printing is Speeding 
up Small Businesses, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 10, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2014-07-10/how-small-businesses-use-3-d-printing-to-create-prototypes-faster, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GTM5-FL9N. 
 19. 3-D Printing: The Printed World, supra note 12. 
 20. In 2014, Solidoodle offered its second-generation 3-D printer for only $499. This printer has 
a build volume of 8” x 8” x 8” and can print layers as thin as 0.1mm. Solidoodle Press, SOLIDOODLE, 
http://www.solidoodle.com/Press (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). Cubify offers four different 3-D printers 
at price points from $999 through $4900. CUBIFY, http://cubify.com/en/Compare/Printers (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2014). The least expensive Cubify printer, as of 2014, has a build volume of 6” x 6” x 6” and 
can print two colors at a time in layers as small as 70 microns. Id. One of Cubify’s most expensive 
printers can print up to three colors in one print and offers a print volume of 10.8” x 10.45” x 9.5”. Id. 
Like the Solidoodle second-generation printer, the more expensive class of Cubify printers print in 
layers of 100 microns. Id. New, affordable stereolithographic printers might offer even better 
resolution, but current models have relatively small build volumes. Joseph Flaherty, New 3-D Printers 
that Don’t Suck, WIRED (July 11, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/design/2012/07/3-d-
printers-that-dont-suck, archived at http://perma.cc/YRY2-98AF; see also Daly, supra note 9, for an 
explanation of stereolithographic printing technology. 
 21. MakerBot Digitizer: Desktop 3D Scanner, MAKERBOT, http://store.makerbot.com/digitizer. 
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 22. Shapeways allows users to upload designs and buy and sell 3-D printed products. 
SHAPEWAYS, http://www.shapeways.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). Thingiverse, by Makerbot, 
allows users to upload and share designs to print at-home on their personal 3-D printers. MAKERBOT 
THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). Another website, Sculpteo, 
allows users to upload their 3-D design and have it printed by an industrial-grade 3-D printer in a 
variety of materials. SCULPTEO, http://www.sculpteo.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 23. eBay Inc. Is Getting Multi-Dimensional with eBay Exact, EBAY INC. BLOG (July 11, 2013), 
http://blog.ebay.com/ebay-inc-is-getting-multi-dimensional-with-ebay-exact, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5B52-FFXK. 
 24. Natasha Lomas, The Much-Hyped 3D Printer Market is Entering a New Growth Phase, Says 
Gartner, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 2, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/10/02/gartner-3-D-printer-market-
forecast, archived at http://perma.cc/LT8K-X25K. 
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separate online retail department for 3-D printers and their components.
25
 
While current consumers are primarily hobbyists, Gartner projects that 
ordinary consumers will make up a larger percentage of future sales, 
particularly as user-friendly “plug and play” tools become available, likely 
by 2016.
26
 As personal 3-D printing becomes more prevalent, the 
possibilities are truly endless, limited only by the users’ creativity. While 
this seemingly infinite potential is quite exciting, it also raises new legal 
questions: if individuals can 3-D print products, should they be held 
strictly liable for defective products that they manufacture and sell? And if 
not, what should be the scope of individual products liability?  
This Note confronts the issues that arise in applying strict products 
liability law to personal 3-D printer users. Part II will explain the basic 
technology behind 3-D printing and address the expected growth of the 
personal 3-D printer market. Part III will discuss the evolution of products 
liability law and the policy reasons for its transformation. Part IV will 
analyze the impact of 3-D printing on the underlying rationale for strict 
products liability. Finally, Part V will explain the advantages and 
disadvantages of several proposals for resolving these inconsistent policy 
objectives, ultimately recommending that an affirmative defense for 
“micro-sellers” will best resolve this issue. 
II. HOW 3-D PRINTING WORKS 
Every 3-D printed object begins with a digital design for the object. 
Individuals can either develop their own designs with computer aided 
design (“CAD”) software or animation modeling software, or purchase 
and download designs from an online marketplace.
27
 The individual then 
sends the design to the 3-D printer, as it would any ordinary computer 
file.
28
 This design serves as a “virtual blueprint” for the 3-D object.29 
While there are several different methods to achieve 3-D printing, most 
inexpensive personal 3-D printers use fused deposition modeling 
 
 
 25. 3D Printers & Supplies, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=6066126011 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MH98-XQ2S. 
 26. Lomas, supra note 24. 
 27. Matt Petronzio, How 3D Printing Actually Works, MASHABLE (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://mashable.com/2013/03/28/3-D-printing-explained, archived at http://perma.cc/8GTA-UVXB; 
see also Rebecca Matulka, How 3D Printers Work, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (June 19, 2014, 
9:28 AM), http://energy.gov/articles/how-3d-printers-work, archived at http://perma.cc/6CFR-UJSR. 
 28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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technology (“FDM”).30 In FDM 3-D printing, the individual selects the 
input material, called the filament. Most personal 3-D printers offer 
several variations and colors of plastic filament, but industrial 3-D printers 
can print metal, rubber, and powder filaments.
31
 The filament is held in a 
string-like spool, reminiscent of the plastic lanyard used in children’s craft 
projects, in the back of the printer.
32
 After the design is sent to the printer, 
the printer pulls the filament through a tube and into a nozzle, which heats 
the material and squirts it out in thin layers over the platform.
33
 3-D 
printing is also known as additive manufacturing because the printer 
makes passes over the platform, adds more filament to the platform, and 
builds the object layer by layer until it is complete.
34
 Throughout the 
process, the layers automatically fuse together to create a single three-
dimensional object.
35
 
While the process is similar for personal and industrial 3-D printers, 
there are some differences between these processes, evident in the quality 
of the final product. The quality of a 3-D printer is primarily measured by 
 
 
 30. Elizabeth Palermo, Fused Deposition Modeling: Most Common 3D Printing Method, 
LIVESCIENCE (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://www.livescience.com/39810-fused-deposition-
modeling.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6FSV-AAEE. Another type of 3-D printing technology 
involves binding powder substances. This technology is often used to manufacture metal objects. 
These powders can be bound either with glue or heat. C. Hauser et al., Spiral Growth Manufacturing 
(SGM)—A Continuous Additive Manufacturing Technology for Processing Metal Powder by Selective 
Laser Melting, 2005 SOLID FREEFORM FABRICATION SYMP. 1, 1–2, available at http://utwired.engr. 
utexas.edu/lff/symposium/proceedingsArchive/pubs/Manuscripts/2005/2005-01-Hauser.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/CUG5-BB87. The process for both methods is very similar—a layer of powder is 
rolled onto a platform, either glue or heat is used to bind the individual granules, and once the layer is 
hardened, another thin layer of powder deposited on top. Id. 
 31. Stephen Evanczuk & Clive Maxfield, 10 3D Printers Under $1000, EDN NETWORK (Sept. 
19, 2013), http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/systems-interface/4421382/10-3-D-printers-under--
1000, archived at http://perma.cc/GT7W-HSFQ. The plastic filament used in personal 3-D printers is 
available for $43 per spool. In comparison, a 1-liter bottle of resin for a stereolithographic printer costs 
$149. The affordability of the input material may be another reason why FDM is the preferred 
technology for personal 3-D printer manufacturers. Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Petronzio, supra note 27. Industrial 3-D printers may have multiple nozzles to deposit 
different materials simultaneously. Evanczuk & Maxfield, supra note 31. 
 34. Petronzio, supra note 27. 
 35. Id. The different additive processes used to create 3-D objects differ in two important ways: 
(1) the method of depositing the input material and (2) the method of fusing the layers together. 
Sebastian Anthony, What is 3D Printing?, EXTREMETECH (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:16 PM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/115503-what-is-3-D-printing, archived at http://perma.cc/86Y4-
9CAP. Other methods include stereolithography, a process of curing liquid resin to build layers, and 
selective laser sintering, a technique used to fuse powers into a 3-D object. Daly, supra note 9; Hauser 
et al., supra note 30; Alex Lou & Carol Grosvenor, Selective Laser Sintering, Birth of an Industry, 
UNIV. TEXAS (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.me.utexas.edu/news/2012/0712_sls_history.php, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9SVF-RN8L; Elizabeth Palermo, What Is Stereolithograhy?, LIVESCIENCE (July 16, 
2013, 2:39 AM), http://www.livescience.com/38190-stereolithography.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/8
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four factors.
36
 First, quality is measured by the print resolution, which 
refers to the thickness of individual layers.
37
 Personal 3-D printers 
typically print in a lower resolution than industrial 3-D printers, which 
means that the 3-D printed objects are less precise, with thicker layers.
38
 
Second, the number of nozzles, and the respective material fed through 
those nozzles, differentiates personal and industrial 3-D printers. Most 
personal 3-D printers currently only have the capacity to print forms of 
plastic, while their more costly commercial counterparts can print metal, 
rubber, and other materials.
39
 Moreover, personal 3-D printers are usually 
outfitted with only one nozzle, such that they can only print one material 
and in one color at time.
40
 Some personal 3-D printers may have two or 
three nozzles.
41
 On the other hand, industrial grade printers are commonly 
outfitted with multiple nozzles.
42
 The additional nozzles can be used to 
print different materials at the same time or can be used to merely print the 
 
 
 36. See generally 3D Printer Buyer’s Guide, 3DSYSTEMS (2014), http://www.3dsystems.com/ 
files/2014_white_paper_3d_printer_buyers_guide_web.pdf; D.A. Roberson, D. Espalin, and R.B. 
Wicker, 3D Printer Selection: A Decision-Making Evaluation and Ranking Model, 8 VIRTUAL & 
PHYSICAL PROTOTYPING 201 (2013), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. 
1080/17452759.2013.830939#tabModule. See also 3D Printer Comparison, MAKER SHED, 
http://www.makershed.com/pages/3d-printer-comparison (last visited Feb. 6, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QZA3-PD2F; Richard Baguley, 3D Printer Buyer’s Guide 2014, TOM’S GUIDE US 
(Oct. 8, 2013, 7:08 AM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/3d-printer-buyers-guide,news-17651.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QR4F-VVAK; Randall Marsh, 2013 3D Printer Comparison Guide, 
GIZMAG (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.gizmag.com/2013-3d-printer-comparison-guide/30187/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/23BZ-C9VF, for information on what criteria consumers use to 
differentiate 3-D printers. 
 37. See Baguley, supra note 36. 
 38. See Lyndsey Gilpin, 3D Printing: 10 Factors Still Holding It Back, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 19, 
2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/3d-printing-10-factors-still-holding-it-back, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FG8L-GTBC. It should be noted that although personal 3-D printers may 
have lower resolution than industrial-grade 3-D printers, they still average a layer width of only 
0.1mm. See supra note 20. This thickness is the same as that of a strand of hair or a coat of paint. 
Accordingly, personal 3-D printers are perfectly capable of printing high-quality household products, 
but would be insufficiently precise for NASA’s more technical applications.  
 39.  See Mark P. Mills, Will Home Depot, Amazon, or Dell, Launch the 3D Printer Revolution?, 
FORBES (July 16, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markpmills/2014/07/16/will-home-
depot-amazon-or-dell-launch-the-3d-printer-revolution. 
 40. See Michelle Starr, Dual-Nozzle 3D Printer Allows Two-Colour Prints, CNET (Feb, 24, 
2014, 8:55 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/dual-nozzle-3d-printer-allows-two-colour-prints/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DG8F-TSE5. 
 41. Id. 
 42.  See Jason Dorrier, Beyond the Hype and Hope of 3D Printing: What Consumers Should 
Expect, SINGULARITYHUB (Apr. 29, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://singularityhub.com/2014/04/29/beyond-
the-hype-and-hope-of-3d-printing-what-consumers-should-expect/, archived at http://perma.cc/PHH2-
7LZF. 
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same material faster.
43
 Third, the build volume represents the maximum 
sized-object the printer is capable of building. Personal 3-D printers have a 
smaller printing volume than industrial models. While a typical personal 
3-D printer might be able to print object up to 8” x 8” x 8”, an industrial 3-
D printer can print much larger objects.
44
 Accordingly, personal 3-D 
printers are primarily useful for printing toys and other small gadgets at 
this time. Fourth, the print speed affects how quickly the final product can 
be produced. Personal 3-D printers range in print speed from three to three 
hundred millimeters per second;
45
 in other words, it may take several 
hours to print even small objects. Some industrial 3-D printers, however, 
can product objects at speeds 200 to 500 times faster than typical 3-D 
printers.
46
 
While industrial-grade 3-D printers may have faster print speeds that 
person 3-D printers, the typical build time is still too slow to compete with 
traditional manufacturing methods. As a result, 3-D printing 
manufacturers have targeted print speed as a key area for improvement.
47
 
As the consumer 3-D printing market grows, the capabilities of personal 3-
D printers should also expand.
48
 
 
 
 43. Cf. ORD Solutions, 5 Color/Material 3D Filament Printer—With Liquid Cooling!, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ordsolutions/5-color-material-3d-filament-printer-
made-in-canad (last visited Oct. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S5S8-4JLM. 
 44. See supra note 20; Ann R. Thryft, Faster Industrial 3D Printer Boosts Build Volume, DESIGN 
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.designnews.com/document.asp?doc_id=252293&dfpPParams= 
ind_183,industry_aero,industry_machinery,aid_252293&dfpLayout=article. See also Michael Franco, 
Giant 3D Printer Starts Spitting out a House, CNET (Mar. 14, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www. 
cnet.com/news/giant-3d-printer-starts-spitting-out-a-house/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 6H4N-Z9VF. 
 45. MAKER SHED, supra note 36.  
 46. Todd Halterman, BAAM Prints a Car in 44 Hours, 3D PRINTER WORLD (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.3dprinterworld.com/article/baam-prints-car-44-hours, archived at http://perma.cc/98LR-
GTK2; Beth McKenna, Bigger Is One Giant Step Closer to Commercialization, MOTLEY FOOL (June 
9, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/08/a-3-d-printer-that-can-print-parts-200-
times-faste.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Z92T-FWMS. For example, in 2014, Cincinnati Inc. 
contracted with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Lab to develop a 3-D printer 
capable of printing 200-500 times faster than most 3-D printers on the market. Id. Functionally, this 
machine was able to manufacture a 3-D printed car in only fourty-four hours. Halterman, supra.  
 47. See Tasha Keeney, Could Hewlett-Packard Be a Serious 3-D Printing Competitor?, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Feb. 5, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2887786-could-hewlett-packard-be-
a-serious-3-d-printing-competitor, archived at http://perma.cc/Z64J-DCH8; Whitney Hipolite, TNO Is 
Developing a Racetrack 3D Printing System that Is ’10 Times Faster than Current Technology’, 
3DPRINT.COM (Jan. 14, 2015), http://3dprint.com/37356/tno-racetrack-3d-printing/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5CDL-49KW; TJ McCue, 500x Faster—New Ultra-Fast 3D Printer in Works, FORBES 
(Feb. 28, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2014/02/28/500x-faster-new-ultra-
fast-3d-printer-in-works.  
 48. This Note discusses the implications of existing personal 3-D printers on products liability 
law, but it should be noted that these effects would be amplified when the capabilities of personal 3-D 
printers expand. 
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The 3-D printing market is poised for significant growth among both 
consumers and businesses. This expected growth is reflected in the value 
of the market for 3-D printing, worth about $3.5 to $4 billion in 2014 and 
projected to reach $180 to $490 billion by 2025.
49
 One Citigroup analyst, 
who specializes in 3-D printing markets, predicts that the 3-D printing 
market will triple in the next five years.
50
 As 3-D printing technology 
becomes more prevalent in the consumer sphere, the legal issues 
associated with 3-D printing will also become more significant. Academic 
scholars and news journalists alike have thoroughly discussed the 
intellectual property concerns associated with 3-D printing.
51
 However, the 
products liability implications of 3-D printing have not faced similar 
attention.
52
  
III. HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
The umbrella of products liability law is comprised of various legal 
theories concerning the liability of a seller of a product when personal 
injury or property damage is caused by a product defect.
53
 Products 
liability statutes vary by state, but the “seller” is generally defined as “any 
person or entity that is engaged in the business of selling products, 
whether the sale is for resale, or for use or consumption.”54 Thus, this 
definition of “seller” covers not only retailers, but also manufacturers, 
 
 
 49. Tasha Keeney, 3-D Printing: Analysts Are Underestimating the Future, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Feb. 3, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2877996-3-d-printing-analysts-are-
underestimating-the-future, archived at http://perma.cc/X49Q-RE2M. See also Ashlee Vance, 3D 
Printers: Make Whatever You Want, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www. 
businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/3-D-printers-make-whatever-you-want, archived at http://perma. 
cc/M9LB-UJ2U (accurately projecting the growth of the 3-D printing market from $1.7 billion in 2012 
to $3.7 billion by 2015). 
 50. Dan Gallagher, 3D Printing Stocks Jump on Bullish Citi Note, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 26, 
2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/3-D-printing-stocks-jump-on-bullish-citi-note-2013-08-26, 
archived at http://perma.cc/L94D-8UU8. 
 51. See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: 
It’s No “Use”, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771 (2013); Charles W. Finocchiaro, 
Note, Personal Factory or Catalyst for Piracy? The Hype, Hysteria, and Hard Realities of Consumer 
3-D Printing, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 473 (2013); Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting 3D Printing 
Designs and Objects, FORBES (May 29, 2013, 10:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/ 
2013/05/29/protecting-3d-printing-designs-and-objects, archived at http://perma.cc/N8R9-KWNY. 
 52. Nora Engstrom recently published an insightful essay in Fall 2013, identifying some of the 
potential implications of 3-D printing on products liability law. In this brief essay, however, Engstrom 
left open the question of how to resolve these potential problems. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Essay, 
3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 37 
(2013). 
 53. CHARLES J. NAGY, JR., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:1 (3d ed. 2013). 
 54. Model Uniform Product Liabilities Act § 102(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979); see, 
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-1 (West 2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1028 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1019 
 
 
 
 
wholesalers, distributors, and designers of products.
55
 Most courts exclude 
“occasional sellers” from the strict products liability definition of sellers.56 
Occasional sellers are those “whose sale of a product is wholly incidental 
to the seller’s regular business.”57 The primary causes of action under the 
products liability umbrella include breach of express or implied warranty, 
negligence, and strict products liability for manufacturing, design, and 
warning defects.
58
  
Products liability law historically revolved around warranty contracts 
between buyers and sellers.
59
 Historically, businesses were small 
organizations, and buyers and sellers had essentially equivalent bargaining 
power and equal ability to bear the risk of defect.
60
 Products were 
relatively simple, so buyers were capable of inspecting a product for 
defects.
61
 Under the traditional products liability doctrine, buyers only had 
a cause of action against the direct seller, based upon a theory of express 
or implied warranty of fitness.
62
 This theory reflected judicial and societal 
 
 
 55. Model Uniform Product Liabilities Act § 102.  
 56.  See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors 
of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 223 –44 and 223 nn.49, 50 (1987) (“Comment f to 
Section 402A and case law clearly indicate . . . that strict liability applies to persons engaged in the 
business of selling products; the rule does not apply to ‘occasional’ sellers.”). 
 57. Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 570 F.3d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Galindo v. 
Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1220 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding most decisions that found the seller 
to be an occasional seller “involved a single sale or transaction” in the context of depreciated 
equipment). The precise definition of “occasional sellers,” however, is not entirely clear and varies by 
state. For example, the case law is clear that an isolated sale of a product is categorized as occasional, 
but the case law is less clear on multiple sales of the same product. See infra note 113. In Comment f, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A specified that the rule of strict products liability does not 
apply to “the occasional seller of food or other such products who is not engaged in that activity as a 
part of his business,” such as a housewife who, on one occasion, sells her neighbor a jar of jam or the 
owner of an automobile who, on one occasion, sells it to a used car dealer. However, the Restatement 
similarly failed to clarify whether individuals who make more than one isolated sale are subject to the 
rule of strict products liability. This distinction may take on greater relevance in the context of 3-D 
printing. See infra note 113. 
 58. CHARLES J. NAGY, JR., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:9 (3d ed. 2013). See 
also infra notes 62, 71. 
 59. Gary E. Sullivan & Braxton Thrash, Purchasers Lacking Privity Overcoming “The Rule” for 
Express Warranty Claims: Expanding Judicial Application of Common Law Theories and Liberal 
Interpretation of U.C.C. Section 2-318, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 51 (2012). 
 60. See infra note 65. 
 61. JANE P. MALLOR ET AL., BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 400 (11th 
ed. 2001). 
 62. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 51–52. Today, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), adopted 
by the majority of states, governs claims for breach of express or implied warranty. The Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act also regulates written warranties on consumer products. Pub. L. 93-637 (1975) 
(codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). An express warranty is an affirmative statement or 
promise regarding the fitness or merchantability of the product and the seller’s commitment to remedy 
defects. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012). The U.C.C. also provides for two types of implied warranties: (1) an 
implied warranty of merchantability and (2) an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
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concern with the potentially unlimited liability for sellers in expanding 
liability beyond privity of contract.
63
 
In the early to mid-1900s, courts reconsidered the principles behind the 
requirement of privity.
64
 While the historical market conditions of face-to-
face transactions and equal ability to inspect for defects supported this 
requirement, modern transactions often involved far-removed 
manufacturers and less technically-competent consumers.
65
 The expansion 
of products liability law was imperative to address this new economic 
system.
66
 Two reasons, in particular, drove this change. First, because 
these modern buyers were more removed from the actual sale, the 
manufacturers were in the better position to have knowledge of probable 
danger.
67
 Thus, manufacturers had a duty of vigilance, extending beyond 
the immediate purchaser. Because the buyer was unable to inspect the 
product, all incidental users of the product relied on the manufacturer to 
 
 
U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315. U.C.C. § 2-314 defines implied warranty of merchantability, in pertinent part, 
as “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” U.C.C. § 2-314. U.C.C. § 2-315 
provides that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises “[w]here the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to known any particular purpose for which the goods are required and 
that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.” U.C.C. 
§ 2-315. A buyer may seek remedy for breach of warranty where the seller breaks his promise of 
warranty. Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N: BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION (Dec. 2006), http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus01-businesspersons-
guide-federal-warranty-law, archived at http://perma.cc/NTT2-6U2Q. 
 63. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 56. In the landmark case of Winterbottom v. Wright, Lord 
Abington eloquently articulated the concern of expanding liability for product defects, stating: 
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every 
passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the 
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this 
to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which 
I can see no limit, would ensue. 
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).  
 64. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916); Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80–81 (N.J. 1960). 
 65. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 80–81. The Henningsen court recognized that:  
The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in the law 
when marketing conditions were simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to face 
on an equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were relatively uncomplicated 
and conducive to inspection by a buyer competent to evaluate their quality. 
Id. at 80. However, the court determined that, in the modern economy, the buyer-seller relationship 
was different: 
[T]he manufacturer became remote from the purchaser . . . . Thus, where the commodities 
sold are such that if defectively manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb, then 
society’s interests can only be protected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the 
maker and his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer. 
Id. at 80–81.  
 66. See id. at 83. 
 67. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053–55; accord Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
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inspect for defects.
68
 Second, manufacturers were growing in both size and 
scope, such that they were better able to spread the costs of injuries from 
defective products.
69
 Applying the premise that the burden should be borne 
by those who can best spread and absorb the losses, courts expanded 
traditional products liability doctrine beyond privity.
70
  
After this expansion, users of defective products were not limited to 
remedy for breach of warranty, but also had standing to bring negligence 
actions.
71
 However, in cases of defective goods, plaintiffs frequently had 
insufficient evidence to prove that the manufacturer or other seller acted 
negligently.
72
 Although the scope of liability had expanded, manufacturers 
still routinely escaped liability for these negligence actions.
73
 As a result, it 
was less expensive for manufacturers to pay damages in the negligible 
percentage of successful lawsuits rather than to take efforts to prevent 
 
 
 68. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053–55. 
 69. See Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Industrial 
Revolution From 1880 to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897, 897 (2009), for a discussion on the rise of 
productivity in the manufacturing sector from 1880 to 1920. Technological advances, such as 
electricity and the assembly line, as well as the urbanization of the American labor force, resulted in 
economies of scale in the manufacturing industry. Id. at 898. 
 70. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 81. The Henningsen court, adopting the reasoning laid out by 
Justice Cardozo in MacPherson, recognized that eliminating the requirement of privity ensures that 
“the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a position 
to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur.” Id. In 
the case of manufactured goods, the manufacturer is in both the best position to control the danger and 
the best position to spread the losses. Thus, the manufacturer should owe the same duty to all users of 
its products as it does to the direct purchaser. 
 71. The negligence cause of action probably has the most variance among states as compared 
with other types of claims under the products liability umbrella. The Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
promulgated in 2010, outlines a common approach for negligence actions. As applied to products 
liability, the elements of negligence under the Third Restatement include: (1) the duty of the seller to 
the injured individual, (2) breach of that duty, (3) actual cause, (4) harm within the scope of liability, 
previously known as proximate cause, and (5) physical injury. Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence 
Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harms, 37 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2011). Under the duty element, a manufacturer owes a duty to all 
foreseeable users of its products. This reflects the expansion beyond privity and affords a remedy to 
users other than the purchaser. Id. However, while there may be a low burden for the plaintiff to 
establish the duty element in a negligence action, the plaintiff has to overcome a huge evidentiary 
hurdle to establish breach and proximate cause. It is rare that a plaintiff has sufficient evidence 
regarding the alleged negligence of the manufacturer. Gibson B. Witherspoon, Manufacturer's 
Negligence in Products Liability Cases, 5 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 585, 587 (1964). 
 72. See supra note 71. 
 73. E.g., Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 382 P.2d 399, 403–04 (Nev. 1963) (declining to 
adjudicate on the issue of strict liability, but finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the 
defendant had a duty to inspect for the claimed defect). Cf. Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 
282 F.2d 76, 83 (5th Cir. 1960) (finding that although plaintiff was unable to produce any evidence 
that the dynamite was defective, the explosion itself was enough to shift the burden of proof to 
defendants under a theory of res ipsa loquitor). 
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defects.
74
 Additionally, corporations during this time were much larger 
than their historical counterparts, and their bargaining power greatly 
outweighed that of ordinary consumers. Accordingly, manufacturers 
lacked the incentives to take proper precautions, such as inspecting their 
products for defects and removing them from the marketplace.
75
 The 
doctrine of strict products liability developed in response to this 
discordance, shifting liability onto the sellers by holding them strictly 
liable for defective products.
76
 
The early formation of no-fault liability for product defects was res 
ipsa loquitor.
77
 The res ipsa loquitor doctrine provides for a presumption 
of fault derived from the nature of the accident itself.
78
 In most 
jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitor operates to create an inference of negligence 
under certain factual circumstances.
79
 The seminal case of res ipsa loquitor 
involved an individual who was struck by a barrel falling from a shop 
window.
80
 The court found that the evidence that the barrel was in the 
possession of the shop owner and fell from the window was sufficient to 
 
 
 74.  Cf. Derrick Williams, Note, Secondhand Jurisprudence in Need of Legislative Repair: The 
Application of Strict Liability to Commercial Sellers of Used Goods, 9 TEX.WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 
279–80 (2003) (concluding that for used goods dealers, “satisfying the [negligence] duty of reasonable 
care might only require that trivial precautions . . . be taken”). 
 75. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 86. 
 76. Id.; see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (setting the foundation for strict liability for manufacturing defects). Courts 
reiterated the vulnerability of buyers as a primary purpose in adopting strict liability for products. “The 
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are 
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons 
who are powerless to protect themselves.” Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 
(Cal. 1963) (adopting the logic of Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola). 
 77. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 439 (majority opinion). 
 78. E.g., id. 
 79. See, e.g., Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Res ipsa loquitor is a 
shortcut to a negligence claim.”). For example, in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling, the Supreme Court of 
California found that:  
[T]he evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the bottle here 
involved was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant by 
defendant. It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at the time 
defendant relinquished control, because sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated 
liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully handled. 
150 P.2d at 439. Deducing further, the Court determined that:  
Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an excessive charge 
or a defect in the glass there is a sufficient showing that neither cause would ordinarily have 
been present if due care had been used. Further, defendant had exclusive control over both the 
charging and inspection of the bottles. Accordingly, all the requirements necessary to entitle 
plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to supply an inference of negligence are 
present. 
Id. at 440. 
 80. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1963); 2 H. & C. 722. 
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create a presumption of negligence.
81
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor 
launched the discussion of strict products liability.
82
 In Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., a case decided on res ipsa loquitor grounds, Justice 
Traynor concurred in the judgment, arguing for strict liability for the 
manufacturer instead.
83
 He noted that where the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor raises an inference of negligence and the jury must decide 
whether the inference has been dispelled, “the negligence rule approaches 
the rule of strict liability.”84 Accordingly, he determined that it would be 
better to openly impose the responsibility of strict liability on 
manufacturers, instead of “circuitous[ly]” using res ipsa loquitor to impose 
liability without negligence.
85
 In 1963, the California Supreme Court 
became the first court to adopt a rule of strict products liability, finding 
support for its opinion in Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola.86 
Within two years, the American Law Institute promulgated the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, incorporating the strict products liability 
rule in Section 402A.
87
 Since then, nearly all states have adopted a rule of 
strict liability for defective products.
88
  
 
 
 81. Id. at 300. 
 82. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. The traditional negligence doctrine differs from the strict liability rule by imposing a 
greater burden of proof on the plaintiff. In Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Supreme Court of 
California distinguished the two claims, explaining:  
It is pointed out that in a products liability case the plaintiff in order to recover in strict 
liability in tort must prove that he was injured by a defect in the product and that the product 
was defective when it left the hands of the retailer or manufacturer; whereas to recover in 
negligence the plaintiff must prove the same two elements plus an additional element, 
namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant. 
482 P.2d 681, 683 (Cal. 1971). 
 85. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. 
 86. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 88. See Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 211 
& n.66 (1991) (reviewing WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN 
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991)); see also E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval 
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (incorporating strict products liability principles into federal admiralty 
law). Only Virginia and North Carolina have declined to recognize a strict liability remedy in products 
liability actions. Peter Nash Swisher, Proposed Legislation: A (Second) Modest Proposal to Protect 
Virginia Consumers Against Defective Products, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 19, 20 n.5 (2008). 
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While no-fault liability had previously been applied in the arenas of 
ultra-hazardous activities
89
 and food service,
90
 its application to 
manufacturers and sellers of all types of products was much more 
revolutionary. Courts drew upon a broad range of rationales as support for 
implementing such a dramatic policy shift.
91
 In his article, Rethinking the 
Policies of Strict Products Liability, David Owen concisely summarized 
these policy rationales:  
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product 
quality through the use of mass advertising and merchandising 
practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the 
skill and expertise of the manufacturing community. 
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves 
adequately from defective products due to the vast number and 
complexity of products which must be “consumed” in order to 
function in modern society. 
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify 
the potential product risks, to determine the acceptable levels of 
such risks, and to confine the risks within those levels. 
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are 
probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of 
manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing 
process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this 
negligence are often practicably insurmountable. 
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient to induce 
manufacturers to market adequately safe products. 
 
 
 89. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) 339–40 (Lord Cairns L.C.) 
(appeal taken from Ct. of Exch.) (U.K.) (finding the defendant was “prima facie answerable for all the 
damage which is the natural consequence” of a reservoir he had built on his land (quoting Fletcher v. 
Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265)). Although some states were initially hesitant to adopt a strict liability 
rule following Rylands, by the early twentieth century, “[t]he American authorities, with hardly an 
exception, follow the doctrine [of strict liability].” Kleebauer v. W. Fuse & Explosives Co., 69 P. 246, 
247 (Cal. 1902); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (embracing the Rylands v. 
Fletcher rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, 
The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the 
Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 342–46 (2000). 
 90. E.g., Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1940) (“[T]he sale of 
unwholesome food in violation of [the Ohio penal statute] renders sellers civilly liable in damages to 
those injured, without regard to negligence in the ordinary sense of the word. . . . It is not essential to 
recovery that there be privity of contract between the person injured and the defendant.”). 
 91. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 
681, 684–85 (1980). 
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(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers 
to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents. 
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in 
products can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the 
products as a cost of their doing business, thus assuring that these 
enterprises will fully “pay their way” in the society from which they 
derive their profits.
92
 
As can be seen, many of these reasons parallel those used to eliminate the 
requirement of privity.
93
 And they comparably justified the further 
expansion of manufacturer liability with a rule of strict products liability. 
Furthermore, as businesses became larger and technology became more 
complex, these factors weighed even more heavily in favor of strict 
liability for manufacturers. For example, the larger and more technical a 
business, the better position it is in to identify risks and spread costs, and 
the worse position a consumer is in to protect him or herself from 
defective products. 
This doctrinal change did not occur without major criticism. Scholars 
and jurists alike expressed concern that strict liability was unduly 
burdensome for businesses, deterred manufacturing of worthwhile 
products, and impeded research and development.
94
 Critics have also 
 
 
 92. Id.; see also Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375, 1381, 1385 (2009) (explaining that manufacturers should be held strictly 
liable as a matter of policy because they are better able to absorb and spread the loss, they are in the 
best position to correct product defects and control quality, and they should be incentivized to 
manufacture safer products). Comment c of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A suggests similar 
rationales support a rule of strict liability, explaining: 
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, 
by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special 
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the 
public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it 
is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that 
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for 
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production 
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is 
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to 
afford it are those who market the products. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c. Many of these reasons overlap with those used to 
justify eliminating the requirement of privity. This is quite logical, considering that both the 
elimination of privity and the adoption of a strict products liability rule are expansions of traditional 
torts doctrine and operate to broaden manufacturers’ liability exposure. See supra notes 65, 70 and 
accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 94. Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 303, 304–
05 (1991). Schwartz also notes that claims of overdeterrence lack “reliable data to confirm that such 
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argued that the judiciary overstepped in carving out this doctrine, 
displacing and contradicting the warranty provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which has been adopted by forty-nine states.
95
 Some 
scholars have debated the economic efficiency of strict liability as 
compared to a negligence approach.
96
 Finally, other authors have criticized 
strict products liability as arbitrarily distinguishing product cases from 
other personal injury cases, arguing that there is no meaningful difference 
between them.
97
 
Today, strict products liability operates to hold sellers liable for injuries 
caused by their products, regardless of whether the seller was negligent in 
manufacturing the product, designing the product, or instructing or 
warning customers about foreseeable risks of harm.
98
 Most courts apply 
the strict liability standard codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A or Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
99
 The 
 
 
adverse affects [sic] are caused by the product liability system.” Id. at 314.  
 95. Markle v. Mulholland’s Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 537 (Or. 1973) (en banc) (O’Connell, C.J., 
concurring) (arguing that the court did not have “the license to create a separate body of common law 
which covers substantially the same field and displaces the Code’s explicit provisions”). 
 96. Compare Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207–08 
(1973), with Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1060–61 (1972). 
 97. William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 639, 640. Powers is particularly troubled by the application of different rules to commercial 
defendants in products cases and other personal injury cases, noting that “[i]ncentives for safety might 
support strict liability generally (depending on the empirical evidence), but they do not explain the 
selective application of strict liability to product injuries.” Id. at 645. 
 98. Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The 
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1992). 
 99. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 977–87 
(2007). 
 The Restatement (Second) § 402A reads in pertinent part as follows: 
§ 402A. Special Liability of Sellers of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer  
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if  
 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and  
 (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold.  
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although  
 (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and  
 (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The American Law Institute promulgated this 
section to recognize privity-free strict products liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB., Introduction (1997). In the years following the publication of the Restatement (Second), case 
law evolved into a more precise framework for managing products liability claims. The Restatement 
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Restatement (Third) specifies three types of strict products liability claims: 
manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects.
100
 While the 
Restatement (Second) does not explicitly separate the types of strict 
products liability claims, many jurisdictions that have adopted the 
Restatement (Second) have applied the rule set out in § 402A to 
manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects claims in the 
manner provided by the Restatement (Third).
101
 As a general matter, a 
seller may be strictly liable for injuries caused by a product sold in a 
defective condition if it reaches the “consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold.”102 In addition to strict products 
liability, plaintiffs who are injured by defective products may also bring 
claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation.
103
  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 3-D PRINTING ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW 
A. Impact on Breach of Warranty and Negligence Claims 
3-D printing will have a minimal impact on the breach of warranty 
theory that antedated strict products liability theory. As discussed above, 
this cause of action is based in contract law and is most equitable when 
 
 
(Third), promulgated in 1997, attempted to codify this case law. See id. Of particular import, the 
Restatement (Third) separates the forms of strict products liability into three categories, providing that: 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing 
defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. 
A product: 
 (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design 
even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product; 
 (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller 
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission 
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
 (c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the 
product not reasonably safe. 
Id. § 2. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra note 99. 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 103. See supra notes 62, 71. The Restatement (Second) provides that strict liability claims should 
be accompanied by such other causes of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a. On 
the other hand, the Restatement (Third) recommends that a plaintiff just bring one unified product 
defect claim. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/8
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buyers and sellers have equal bargaining power. 3-D printing enables 
ordinary individuals to act as manufacturers and sellers, and this new 
group of sellers would presumably have equal footing in negotiations with 
buyers, who typically are also individuals. This is comparable to the old, 
pre-Industrial Revolution marketplace, where buyers and sellers had 
relatively equivalent expertise and neither party had significant leverage in 
warranty negotiations.
104
 Thus, the breach of warranty theory would 
undergo negligible, if any, changes as a result of 3-D printing; however, 
the underlying warranties may reflect more even terms as a result of the 
more balanced bargaining landscape. 
The negligence theory of liability should also experience relatively few 
ramifications as a result of 3-D printing, but it may become a more 
feasible option for plaintiffs. Because 3-D printed products are based on a 
digital design, there is presumably a digital record of the defective 
product.
105
 If a plaintiff can access the original design for the product that 
caused his or her injuries, he or she would be in a better position to 
identify the defect. As a result, the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs would 
be alleviated. Additionally, the sudden upswing in the sheer number of 
manufacturers may affect negligence claims. While a limited number of 
large-scale manufacturers have the resources to inspect for and prevent 
defects, as well as recall products that are defective, a much larger group 
of small-scale 3-D printing manufacturers may have trouble taking such 
preventive and corrective action. Thus, the rise of 3-D printing may result 
in a considerable increase in the number of negligence products cases 
because the new group of manufacturers may be more “careless” in 
avoiding design defects.
106
 
B. Impact on Strict Products Liability Claims 
While all products liability theories may be impacted by the increasing 
prevalence of 3-D printing,
107
 strict products liability for design defects 
 
 
 104. See supra note 65.  
 105. See Max Marder, Leave 3D Printing Alone, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2014, 5:02 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-morningside-post/leave-3d-printing-alone_b_4666660.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3SQA-MHM5 (“A 3D printer interprets computer aided design (CAD) 
files—three-dimensional schematics used by engineers since the 1980s—and builds objects up layer-
by-layer out of plastic, metal, or in principle any other material.”). 
 106. The word “careless” is used loosely in this context, merely supposing that manufacturers who 
do not properly prevent and correct defects in their products act “carelessly,” in spite of the fact that 
they may have inadequate resources to do so. 
 107. The theories underlying breach of warranty and negligence claims may be affected by the 
influx of cases likely to arise as a result of the growing number of inexperienced manufacturers/sellers. 
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will likely undergo the most change.
108
 Two categories of individuals 
would be subject to liability for injuries resulting from a defective 3-D 
printed product.
109
 The first category is the “hobbyist inventor” who prints 
and sells the 3-D printed products.
110
 The second type of affected 
individual is the “digital designer” who develops designs and sells them 
via an online marketplace.
111
 Any entities in the subsequent chain of 
commerce might also be liable for these defectively designed products.
112
 
While experienced manufacturers and businesses may already carry 
liability insurance to protect against these sorts of losses, 3-D printing 
enables amateur designers and regular people to take on the same risks, 
albeit with less experience and less protection.
113
  
Although 3-D printing has begun to emerge from its infancy, no case 
law has developed concerning its impact on the liability of individuals as 
of the date of this publication. This is not surprising—until recently, most 
 
 
However, it is not entirely clear how such case law will evolve in response to these new sellers. 
Further inquiry, outside the scope of this Note, would be necessary to make such a determination. 
 108. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability divides product defect cases into the 
discrete categories of manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, on the other hand, provides guidance for all categories of product defects under a 
single rule. This Note does not address whether a strict products liability policy for 3-D printing sellers 
would be more appropriate considering whether a jurisdiction has embraced a risk-utility or consumer-
expectations approach to evaluating design defect claims. It is relevant to recognize, however, that the 
“micro-seller” approach, detailed later in this Note, is more consistent with the similarly seller-focused 
risk-utility test. For more information on the risk-utility and consumer-expectations tests, see, e.g., 
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 252–56 (Miss. 1993) (considering the two 
approaches and explicating their origins).  
 109. Engstrom, supra note 52, at 37–38 (2013). Engstrom also addresses the liability of the 
manufacturer of the 3-D printer. Id. at 38. Because the 3-D printer itself must be defective for such a 
lawsuit to be viable, and strict products liability already effectively contemplates such large-scale 
manufacturers, this Note will not address the impact on this category of individuals. The two 
categories of individuals, the “hobbyist inventor” and “digital designer,” addressed by this Note, are 
identical to those discussed by Engstrom.  
 110. Id. at 37. 
 111. Id. at 38. 
 112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. e (1998). 
 113. It is important to note that these individuals must be actually selling their respective products 
or designs to satisfy the definition of someone “engaged in the business.” Id. § 1 cmt. c. However, it is 
just as important to recognize the unresolved, and potentially minimal, threshold for “seller.” See 
Model Uniform Product Liabilities Act § 102, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979). Because the 
threshold for “occasional seller” is not entirely clear, an individual who sells more than one design or 
3-D printed product may be considered a “seller” for the purposes of strict products liability law. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (providing examples of sellers who “on one 
occasion” made a sale, but not clarifying how many sales exceeds “occasional”); Siemen v. Alden, 341 
N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (finding that defendant’s only sale of a saw or sawmill equipment 
was to plaintiff, so it was “an isolated transaction and [did] not come within the provisions of 402A”). 
The number of individuals potentially subject to liability for 3-D printing designs or 3-D printed 
products depends on courts’ interpretations of “occasional sellers.” This unpredictability highlights the 
importance of a legislative approach to categorizing these sorts of individuals. 
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3-D printers were cost-prohibitive for personal use and the less expensive 
models lacked the build space needed to manufacture more sophisticated 
products. However, some standard is necessary to address the products 
liability issues that will arise as a result of 3-D printing.
114
 The following 
two hypothetical situations draw attention to this issue.
115
 
In the first scenario, an average individual, John, creates a design for 
the plastic components of a toddler car seat. John may have some 
background in engineering, but he has no realistic way to “crash test” the 
car seat as a more experienced manufacturer would. John sells his car seat 
design through a 3-D printing marketplace.
116
 A family with a 3-D printer 
browses the designs on the marketplace and selects John’s design.117 The 
family prints and assembles the 3-D printed components. At some point 
this family gets into a car accident, during which the car seat breaks and 
 
 
 114. This Note ultimately recommends a legislative approach because the present volume of cases 
is still low and courts are often slow to adapt to new technology. For example, the Supreme Court did 
not apply the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure to telephone calls 
until 1967, nearly forty years after it first considered the issue. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
359 (1967); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928). In his article, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, Orin Kerr 
contemplated judicial competency in developing law in response to new technology: 
Courts lack the institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications of new 
technologies they encounter. Judges cannot readily understand how the technologies may 
develop, cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize whether the facts 
of the case before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or atypical. 
Judicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they cannot change quickly and cannot 
test various regulatory approaches. . . . The context of legislative rule-creation offers 
significantly better prospects for the generation of balanced, nuanced, and effective 
investigative rules involving new technologies. 
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858–59 (2004). 
 115. Although the plaintiff in these hypotheticals may theoretically bring a breach of warranty 
action, the reader should assume that no straightforward breach of warranty action is available. The 
hypotheticals were simplified to highlight the issue of strict products liability, but in some cases, a 
breach of warranty claim may also be viable. 
 116. See Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of 
Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 567–68 (2014), for a discussion on whether a CAD file 
should be considered a product. Osborn argues that CAD files may best be analogized to computer 
software. Id. at 568. He notes that most of the commentary on applying strict products liability to 
software distinguishes between whether the software has a greater service aspect or product aspect. Id. 
(citing Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally 
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 534 (2008); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for 
Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 745 n.1, 756 nn.57–58 (2005)). Osborn further proposes that this same 
distinction could apply to CAD files: “courts could label mass-marketed files as products while 
labeling custom-made files, such as complex 3D art, as services.” Id.  
 117. Presumably, in an online marketplace, there are design offerings of brand name 
manufacturers, as well as individuals. The family’s motivation for selecting John’s design is not of 
particular relevance—perhaps it is cheaper, or perhaps there is some other motivation. 
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injures the child occupying it. The family later discovers that the car seat 
broke because John’s design failed to make one of the component parts 
thick enough to withstand the force of an accident. Should John be held 
strictly liable for the injuries to the child that resulted from his defective 
design? 
In the second scenario, Mary finds John’s design on the Internet. She 
realizes that many people will not want to go through the trouble of 
putting together the component parts, so she 3-D prints the parts and 
assembles them herself. Mary then sells these 3-D printed car seats to her 
friends and neighbors with small children. As in the first scenario, a family 
who buys this car seat ends up in a car accident, at which point the car seat 
breaks and injures the child. Should Mary be held strictly liable for the 
injuries that resulted from her manufacture and sale of a defectively 
designed product?
118
 
Of course, car seats are not the only product that could potentially be 
defectively designed or manufactured with a 3-D printer. In 2013, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission recalled sitting stools (the 
stabilizing bar could break), toy play-set figures (the plastic hats on the 
figures created a choking hazard), travel trunks (the handle was too sharp), 
and candle holders (an arm on the candle holder could break allowing the 
candle to fall out).
119
 All of these products can be manufactured using 
current personal 3-D printing technology and the category of potentially 
defective products may expand further when personal 3-D printers are 
improved to print a wider range of materials.
120
 Additionally, the size of 3-
D printed objects alone poses potential liability issues. Today’s personal 3-
D printers are best used to print small objects, toys, and parts, all of which 
 
 
 118. Nora Freeman Engstrom, an Associate Professor at Stanford Law School, reasons that a 
digital design may not be construed as a “product”, but as intangible content, such as that in a book. 
Engstrom, supra note 109, at 38–39. She likens the defective design code to inaccurate information 
contained in The Encylopedia of Mushrooms, which the Ninth Circuit determined to be outside the 
scope of products liability. Id. Alternatively, Engstrom contends, even if digital designs are considered 
products, a court might treat designers like architects or determine that the printing process is a 
substantial change, and refrain from imposing strict liability. Id.; see, e.g., City of Mounds View v. 
Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423–25 (Minn. 1978) (holding that the doctrine of strict liability does not 
apply to architects). It is not obvious, however, that courts will address the design code in this manner. 
Because no court has addressed this particular issue, this Note treats digital designs as “products” to 
illustrate the potential liability issues. 
 119. Recent Recalls, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/ 
Recalls/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EU4N-CYPS. 
 120. See supra note 20. 
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may create choking and asphyxiation hazards for infants and young 
children.
121
  
In both scenarios described above, the scale of operations may vary 
significantly. The theory of strict liability developed in response to 
enterprise sellers; however, 3-D printing makes small-scale manufacturing 
more feasible.
122
 In a larger scale operation, there might be more basis for 
encouraging these sellers to carry insurance as an ordinary business would. 
On the other hand, it may not be socially beneficial to encourage this sort 
of liability protection in the case of small-scale individuals selling designs 
or printed products to their friends and family.
123
 These hypothetical 
individuals may not even realize they are “engaged in the business” of 
selling the defective design or product until it is too late.
124
 In addition, 
while the Consumer Product Safety Commission might be able to recall 
products manufactured and sold on a large scale, it cannot possibly 
manage recalls of all defective products manufactured on a smaller 
 
 
 121. See supra note 20 for information regarding the build volume of today’s personal 3-D 
printers. 
 122. Engstrom explains that this influx of small-scale sellers destroys the syllogism justifying 
strict products liability. She defines the syllogism as “(1) those who manufacture and sell products 
tend to be enterprises; (2) imposing liability on enterprises is beneficial; and, consequently, (3) 
imposing liability on manufacturers and sellers is beneficial.” Engstrom, supra note 109, at 40–41. If 
ordinary Americans become the manufacturers and sellers, however, “3-D printing severs the long-
established identity between manufacturers and sellers, on the one hand, and enterprises, on the other.” 
Id. at 41. Accordingly, we must re-examine the underlying policies of strict products liability and 
evaluate whether they still apply after 3-D printing overhauls the traditional syllogism. 
 123. Encouraging individuals and small businesses to buy liability insurance by holding them 
strictly liable may seem like a fair solution, but it is necessary to more closely examine the 
consequences of such a strategy. For a large-scale seller, reallocating resources to purchase insurance 
may mean reducing salaries by a small percentage, minimally raising prices across product lines, or 
some other minor operational change. While smaller-scale sellers can make similar changes, the cost 
of insurance may be a greater percentage of their operations, requiring more drastic measures. For a 
small-scale seller, the money for insurance may come from reduced product safety inspections or a 
switch to lower quality input materials. Neither of these changes seems particularly socially 
satisfactory. Alternatively, a small-scale seller who decides to opt out of buying liability insurance 
altogether would not need to reallocate resources in this way. However, if that seller is later sued and 
held strictly liable for a defective product, he may be unable to cover the cost of the damages, leaving 
the injured plaintiff with an inadequate remedy. Moreover, the idea of increasing product prices to 
insure against potential liability is “often infeasible for design defect cases involving an entire product 
line because of the magnitude of the loss.” W. Kip Viscusi, Product and Occupational Liability, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 71, 73. As can be seen, strict products liability for small-scale sellers 
leaves much to be desired. Because 3-D printing increases the numerosity of small-scale sellers as well 
as their potential for liability, methods to limit the scope of strict products liability for these sellers 
should be more thoughtfully considered. 
 124. In other words, without a clearly defined category of “occasional seller,” an individual may 
make an isolated sale, and then another, until some threshold is reached at which point he is “engaged 
in the business of selling” and may be subject to strict products liability. See supra notes 55, 113; see 
also Osborn, supra note 116, at 570 (raising the question of whether a one-time uploader of a CAD file 
should be considered an occasional seller).  
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scale.
125
 Finally, the fairness rationale for imposing strict liability on 
sellers of defective products is incompatible with imposing strict liability 
on small-scale sellers who may not have the resources or ability to incur 
the costs of such liability.
126
 
C. Searching for a Policy-Based Solution  
Before discussing any proposals for managing the impact of 3-D 
printing, policy objectives should be considered in the context of 3-D 
printing. One of the major benefits of 3-D printing is that it advances 
innovation by allowing designers and manufacturers to “piggyback” on 
each other’s designs and customize products.127 However, this should be 
balanced with the desire to promote consumer safety, as well as consumer 
reliance on manufacturers.
128
 Some consideration should also be given to 
the benefits of uniformity and predictability that accompany a bright-line 
rule.
129
 While these objectives overlap with some of those served by the 
strict products liability theory, as outlined above, they undermine several 
of the policy justifications for strict products liability. 
First, strict products liability is often justified as a way to place risk on 
the party in the best position to bear the risk of loss.
130
 While that principle 
makes sense in the context of large enterprise sellers, it does not translate 
well to small-scale 3-D printing sellers. This new group of sellers is on 
relatively equal footing with buyers in their ability to bear the risk. 
Similarly, strict products liability developed, in part, to manage the 
 
 
 125. See infra note 147. 
 126. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous 
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235 (1994). Wertheimer suggests that in addition to a basis in 
economic theory, section 402A and strict products liability “[were] even more strongly motivated by 
fairness.” Id. at 1235. The idea of fairness contemplated by Wertheimer “embodies the maxim that 
those who design, market, and profit from a product should also pay for the injuries it causes.” Id. But 
even this conception of fairness presumes an enterprise manufacturer. In a two-party transaction, both 
parties “profit” from the transaction in some way and both parties bear some risk. See Powers, supra 
note 97, at 20 n.35 (citing Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) 
(arguing that the alleged injurer imposes no more risks on the victim than vice versa)). Thus, fairness 
may also be recognized by requiring both parties to check for defects where they have equal 
bargaining power or by holding the victim accountable unless the manufacturer was truly negligent. 
 127. See supra note 12. 
 128. Osborn, supra note 116, at 566 (“The law must balance incentivizing proper care with 
incentivizing manufacturing and related commercial activity.”). 
 129. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681–82 (1988) (discussing that a bright-line rule 
creates a “gain in specificity”); Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 
2010) (discussing the many benefits of a bright-line rule and stressing that “[u]ncertainty can lead to 
many undesirable consequences”). 
 130. See supra note 92. 
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discrepancy in bargaining power between buyers and sellers.
131
 Such 
discrepancy does not exist, however, in the case of small-scale 3-D 
printing sellers. Although strict liability deters sellers from developing 
new products, large-scale designers and manufacturers at least have the 
resources to test novel ideas and can offset the costs of liability.
132
 This 
deterrent effect is aggravated in the context of small-scale sellers, who do 
not have sophisticated research and development departments and cannot 
adequately spread these costs across product lines.
133
 As discussed above, 
the solution is not as straightforward as simply requiring these small-scale 
sellers to buy insurance.
134
 Assuming the enormous potential for 
innovation and societal benefit is worth encouraging, products liability law 
must be modified to at least partially mitigate this deterrent effect. 
V. AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOR MICRO-SELLERS 
While many states employ a common law approach to strict products 
liability, a legislative or regulatory approach might better achieve a more 
predictable and straightforward rule.
135
 It may be difficult, however, to 
develop a statute that encompasses all possible dangers from defective 3-D 
printed products.
136
 Resistance to a statute modifying the current products 
liability framework should also be expected. As a result of the strong 
 
 
 131. See supra note 76. 
 132. See Posner, supra note 126, at 43. 
 133. For small-scale sellers, the risk of strict liability is higher relative to the benefits of selling the 
product because the seller has limited resources over which to spread costs. Cf. Williams, supra note 
74 (discussing the cost-benefit analysis in the context of used goods dealers); Gerald F. Tietz, Strict 
Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through 
Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361, 1440–42 (1993) (discussing strict liability’s effect on the 
cost-benefit analysis generally). 
 134. See supra note 123. Maintaining the status quo and applying the strict products liability 
theory to this new group of manufacturers is, of course, the easiest solution. It requires no additional 
time or effort by the legislature or judiciary. However, this system lacks fairness for the seller; it 
continues to favor the buyer in a marketplace where the scales are balanced and deters innovation. 
 135. See supra note 114. 
 136. Many states, and the federal government, have adopted or proposed legislation to prohibit the 
production of 3-D printed guns. E.g., H.D. 94, 2014 Leg., 434th Sess. (Md. 2014), available at 
http://openstates.org/md/bills/2014/HB94/documents/MDD00053513. 3-D printed firearms pose a 
significant, but vastly different, danger than defective 3-D printed products. See generally Julian J. 
Johnson, Note, Print, Lock, and Load: 3-D Printers, Creation of Guns, and the Potential Threat to 
Fourth Amendment Rights, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 337, 340 (analyzing “the tension that 
exists between Second and Fourth Amendment rights amidst the rising prominence of 3-D printing 
technology”). Similar statutes, however, may be helpful to bar the 3-D printing production of other 
deleterious and inherently dangerous products.  
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opinions for and against strict products liability, any change will likely 
encounter significant contention.
137
  
One proposal to this anticipated problem is to expand the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to develop a more comprehensive 
inspection and certification program. The Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) increased the authority of the CPSC, 
requiring it to issue a certificate for certain classes of products, certifying 
that the product complies with all rules and regulations under the Act.
138 
The CPSIA requires third-party testing for certification of a variety of 
products, but the statute particularly focuses on safety certification for 
children’s products.139 The CPSIA also increased penalties for those 
manufacturers who fail to comply with the laws, providing that violators 
may be subject to civil monetary penalties or up to five years of 
imprisonment.
140
  
 
 
 137. See, e.g., supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text; supra note 126. 
 138. Turkmenistan, a small country that gained independence in 1991 after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, recently adopted a similar measure that grants certification to products that pass quality 
and safety requirements. Huseyn Hasanov, Law on Certification Takes Effect in Turkmenistan, TREND 
(Dec. 29, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/turkmenistan/2226001.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F9DH-2UWC. While it is too early to observe the success of this program, the 
Turkmenistan economy is quite different from that of the United States. Turkmenistan is noticeably 
smaller, both in size and population. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Commerce described the 
Turkmenistan market as lacking “consistent and transparent business legislation” and their government 
as corrupt at all levels. Doing Business in Turkmenistan: 2012 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. 
Companies, U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, at 3, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkmenistan/ 49351/ 
pdf/Doing%20Business%20in%20Turkmenistan%202012%20CCG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
8Q5Y-VJ9B. Given these vast differences, even if such a certification program proved to reduce 
defects and their resulting injuries in Turkmenistan, it is not clear that the United States would 
experience similar success from a comparable initiative. 
 Another possibility is to permit manufacturers (excluding those already required by the statute) to 
choose to get CPSC safety certification. The manufacturers could then use the certification when 
marketing their products. For example, when listing a 3-D printed product in an online marketplace, 
the seller could indicate the third-party safety approval to attract safety-conscious consumers. 
However, this fails to adequately address the issue of a “neighborhood seller” in two ways. First, 
consumers may still feel comfortable purchasing non-certified products from a small-scale seller that 
they know or are acquainted with. Unfortunately, these are exactly the types of amateur manufacturers 
that may be the most dangerous with 3-D printers because they arguably have the least manufacturing 
and design expertise. Second, the neighborhood seller may believe that certification is really for large-
scale operations and is not necessary for a “mom and pop” 3-D printing manufacturer. This is 
inconsistent with the goal of mitigating the injuries associated with these types of products. 
 139. Regulations, Mandatory Standards and Bans, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/Regulations-Laws--Standards/Regulations-Mandatory-Standards--
Bans/Regulated-Products (last visited Oct. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N3QH-33EX; see 
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2052, 2063(a) (2008).  
 140. Regulations, Mandatory Standards and Bans, supra note 139. 
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However, for the majority of products, no third-party testing or 
certification is required.
141
 Thus, for most products, the CSPC can only 
recall an unsafe product already on the market. This system is minimally 
useful in reducing the injuries associated with products manufactured on a 
small scale. 3-D printed products designed or manufactured by small-scale 
organizations would not be “caught” by the CPSC system before they 
caused an injury. The CPSC employs a National Electronic Injury 
Surveillance System (NEISS) which gathers data from approximately 100 
hospitals to generate a probability sample of all 5,000+ United States 
hospitals with emergency departments.
142
 Because products manufactured 
on a small-scale are inherently few in number, it is unlikely that their 
resultant injuries would present often enough on the NEISS to reach the 
level of scrutiny needed for a product recall.
143
 An expansion of the CPSC 
to provide for third-party testing and certification of all products might 
mitigate the potential injuries from 3-D printed products by approving the 
products before they even entered the market. With reduced injuries, it 
would not be unreasonable to hold sellers of 3-D printed products and 
designs strictly liable when their defective products do cause injuries. 
Yet, there are several issues with this proposal. First, a certification 
scheme faces obvious financial costs, which would need to be borne by the 
government, the companies requesting certification, or passed along to the 
consumers. None of these outcomes are particularly desirable. The 
government is already bogged down in enormous debt and is not in a 
position to bear additional costs.
144
 If businesses were to bear these costs, 
 
 
 141. For these products, the CPSC learns about hazardous products through a consumer hotline 
and website, as well as through the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), which 
collects data on consumer product-related injuries treated in emergency rooms. National Electronic 
Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Research--Statistics/NEISS-Injury-Data (last visited Oct. 15, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/5AH3-KD6Y.  
 142. National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/National-
Electronic-Injury-Surveillance-System-NEISS/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AH6N-MNM9. 
 143. See id. 
 144. For each of the listed groups (government, businesses, consumers) there are potential 
negative consequences to bearing the costs of certification. As mentioned, the government is already in 
considerable debt, so any additional cost likely would need to be paid for either by reallocating 
existing funds away from other programs or by raising taxes. It seems unlikely that such a certification 
system would be more socially beneficial than lower taxes or other government programming, but it is 
difficult to predict without knowing the precise number of injuries and deaths such a system would 
prevent.  
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then the cost-saving effect of this plan is diminished.
145
 And if consumers 
were to bear these costs, the demand for 3-D printed goods would fall and, 
consequently, the incentive to innovate and manufacture 3-D printed 
products would also decline.
146
 Second, such certification would be 
burdensome and expensive to enforce.
147
 It would necessitate monitoring 
online marketplaces for 3-D designs and 3-D printed products, and would 
still struggle to reach home manufacturing businesses.
148
  
A second proposal is to expand and clarify the “occasional sellers” 
category, eliminating strict products liability for this group and leaving 
only the actions of negligence and breach of warranty as remedies for 
 
 
 145. In other words, the point of such a certification scheme would be to reduce businesses’ costs 
stemming from strict liability for defective products. However, if businesses must bear the costs of a 
certification system, then the benefit created by the system is mitigated. In order to cover these costs 
without reducing profit margins, businesses would need to cut costs elsewhere or increase the prices of 
their products, passing along the cost to the consumers. Neither of these outcomes is particularly 
desirable. 
 146. This is a basic principle of economics. If a shift in supply causes the price of a product to 
rise, then demand for the product will decrease accordingly. Strict liability similarly operates to 
increase the cost of products, and consequently, decreases consumer demand. See Antonio J. Senagore, 
The Benefits of Limiting Strict Liability for Used-Product Sellers, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 349, 358 
(2010) (“By incorporating the cost of accidents into the cost of manufacture, strict liability seeks to 
reduce consumer demand for dangerous goods.”). Cf. Catherine Rampell, Why is Turkey Cheaper 
When Demand is Higher?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/11/24/magazine/why-is-turkey-cheaper-when-demand-is-higher.html. One of the objectives of 
narrowing strict liability for defective 3-D printed goods is to encourage innovation by designers and 
manufacturers of 3-D printed products. However, such innovation is dependent on consumer demand 
and adoption as much as it is dependent on lower costs stemming from reduced exposure to strict 
liability claims. See Demand and Innovation: How Customer Preferences Shape the Innovation 
Process 12–13 (NESTA/The Work Foundation, Working Paper: March 2010), available at 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/demand_and_innovation.pdf (“Demand is a necessary 
condition for successful innovation.”). 
 147. As a frame of reference, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has a budget 
authorization of $136 million in 2014, increased from $80 million in 2008. 15 U.S.C. § 2081(a) 
(2008); U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET (2008), available at 
http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/122580/2008operatingplan.pdf. The CPSIA provided the $56 million 
of additional funding, in large part, to cover the cost of the additional testing for children’s products. 
See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, 5 Years Later, the Law that Saved the CPSC, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2013, 
6:26 PM), http://www.mintz.com/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId= 
2246&PortalId=0&DownloadMethod=attachment. As can be extrapolated, further expanding the 
CPSC to cover testing for a broader range of products would be extremely costly. Moreover, the cost 
would almost surely outweigh the benefits of reduced injuries and medical expenses. The issue that 
arises with 3-D printing manufacturing is the potential for an upswing of defective products produced 
on a small scale. However, because the products are manufactured on a small scale, the number of 
injuries and the costs of those injuries for each manufactured product is likely to be low compared to 
the cost of testing and certifying each respective product. 
 148. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to require at-home sellers to certify their products 
before selling them. As discussed above, small-scale sellers may not recognize that they are “in the 
business of selling” and may believe such requirements are inapplicable to them. See supra note 124; 
infra note 162. 
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individuals injured by their defective products.
149
 This category could be 
expanded to include sellers who do not make their livelihood selling the 
product, but make more than an “isolated sale.”150 Under a bright line rule 
for “occasional sellers,” a seller may better predict whether he would be 
held strictly liable and make more informed manufacturing decisions.
151
 
While this is disadvantageous for victims of defective products, the 
decreased liability risk may encourage sellers to innovate.
152
 As discussed 
above, innovation is a significant benefit of 3-D printing and should be 
encouraged when socially beneficial.
153
 Moreover, this proposal advances 
the policy objective of placing the cost on the party who is best able to 
bear the risk.
154
 By setting a clear threshold for occasional sellers, the 
judiciary or the legislature can ensure that only those sellers who can 
spread and absorb the losses are held strictly liable.
155
 Additionally, this 
proposal holds consumers partially responsible for inspecting for defects. 
When consumers purchase products from small-scale sellers, they are on 
relatively equal footing to bargain for price and warranty and may also 
have equivalent expertise to check for defects. And the consumer would 
still have recourse against the “occasional seller” through a negligence or 
breach of warranty action, although the plaintiffs would bear a greater 
evidentiary burden in such action.
156
  
On the other hand, there are several disadvantages under this proposal. 
First, the limited liability risk may also discourage sellers to take 
precautions and check for defects. If sellers believe that they will not be 
held liable for injuries from their defective products, they may eliminate 
 
 
 149. See supra notes 55, 113 for more information on “occasional sellers.” 
 150. This Note intentionally declines to conclusively resolve the definition of “occasional seller.” 
The legislature, after additional market research and statistical analysis, would be in the best position 
to define this term. This Note does propose that any specific definition should encompass both the 
number of units sold and the total revenue. 
 151. See Christopher Bingham Galligan, Case Note, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals: 677 F.3d 
1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 23 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 491, 506–07 (2013). 
Bright-line rules as a whole are beneficial because they foster consistency throughout the 
courts and because they alert parties to what is allowed and what is not in the eyes of the law. 
The Supreme Court has stated that one of the benefits of a bright-line rule is that the rule can 
provide “clear and unequivocal” guidelines for handling specific situations. Additionally, the 
Second Circuit has noted that one of the benefits of a bright line rule is that it is “relatively 
easy for district courts to apply and avoids protracted litigation and discovery.” 
Id. 
 152. See David Brown, Managing Risk and Innovation: The Challenge for Smaller Businesses, U. 
WARWICK RISK INITIATIVE BRIEFING (1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/ 2368582.pdf. 
 153. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 151. 
 156. See supra note 71. 
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all prophylactic measures they currently have in place to reduce costs.
157
 
Additionally, while this proposal would encourage innovation of socially 
beneficial products, it would also encourage innovation of products that 
are detrimental to society.
158
 A bright-line test also creates a perverse 
incentive for businesses who are “on the border” of the threshold to try to 
stay below it, which could ultimately stagnate innovation of those less-
useful products.
159
 A third issue is that, under this system, buyers may be 
hesitant to buy 3-D printed goods from small-scale sellers because they 
have more limited legal remedies in case of a product defect.
160
 This gives 
large businesses an even greater advantage.
161
 Finally, any bright line 
threshold would be arbitrary. It would be unfair to give small sellers, who 
are arguably “in the business of selling,” the benefits of the occasional 
seller category. While someone who sells two or three products may not 
be “in the business of selling,” someone who sells fifty products probably 
should be considered a seller as they would have developed a bit more 
expertise and can spread any losses across all of those sales. Thus, would 
sellers who sell twenty-five or thirty products be considered “occasional 
sellers?” What about those who sell ten products? As these examples 
 
 
 157. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2457, 2464 (2013) (“[I]f victims cannot identify the negligent acts or omissions, they will not be able 
to formulate negligence theories based on those occurrences, and negligence law will not serve 
effectively as a regulator of precautionary incentives.”). 
 158. Cf. Viscusi, supra note 123, at 88 (discussing how products liability can “have a particularly 
chilling effect on product innovation”). Conversely, eliminating products liability would result in a 
lack of deterrence of the development of particularly risky products, where such deterrence may 
perhaps be beneficial. 
 159. If a business constantly seeks to remain under the occasional seller threshold to avoid strict 
liability, then it may stagnate its own growth. In theory, however, a business that manufactures a 
socially desirable product would choose to grow because any additional liability it may face would be 
outweighed by the additional income from the growth. Cf. Nicholas Graham, BP’s Profits Far 
Outweigh the Cost of Cleaning Up Gulf Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2010, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/27/bps-profits-far-outweigh_n_591992.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TJ4U-YCLY (explaining that BP’s profits significantly outweighed the costs of its 
major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010). These manufacturers can be expected to act in a manner 
similar to BP, whose high profits allowed it to expand its oil drilling even with the risk and actuality of 
a major oil spill. 
 160. Buying a product from a seller who is not subject to strict products liability for defects is 
riskier than buying that product from a seller who is. All else being held equal, a rational consumer 
will choose the less risky alternative. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, 
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 159, 165–68 (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 1991). 
 161. Large-scale businesses already have advantages over small businesses, such as economies of 
scale and the capital to make investments in machines and labor. Economies of Scale and Scope, THE 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.economist.com/node/12446567. A system that 
would give large businesses an even greater advantage may ultimately eliminate the ability of small 
businesses to compete. 
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demonstrate, it is tremendously difficult to draw a bright line, which likely 
explains why courts have so vaguely defined “occasional seller.”162 
The third proposal, and ideal approach, is to create a separate category 
and legal standard for “micro-sellers,” derived from the “occasional seller” 
category, but more flexible and less arbitrary. This “micro-seller” category 
would cover those sellers who surpass “occasional seller,” but are not 
quite enterprise sellers. These are the sellers that are not in the best 
position to spread or absorb the losses and do not have superior bargaining 
power over their customers. Instead of applying strict liability to this 
category of sellers, this Note proposes an equitable affirmative defense to 
strict liability. 
Under a theory of strict products liability, once a product is shown to 
be defective and to have caused the injury, the seller is liable unless he or 
she can demonstrate an affirmative defense, such as unforeseeable misuse 
or assumption of risk. However, under my proposed “micro-seller” 
affirmative defense, once the plaintiff establishes that the product was 
defective and caused his or her injury, the seller will have the opportunity 
to avoid strict liability by establishing that strict liability, in fairness, 
should not apply. In its fairness analysis, the court should consider factors 
such as (1) the seller’s experience in manufacturing, selling, or designing 
products, (2) the scale of the seller’s business in units and dollars, (3) the 
seller’s ability to spread costs or buy insurance, (4) the societal desirability 
of the specific product at issue, and (5) the seller’s good faith.  
Each of these factors promotes a particular policy rationale for 
excusing some sellers from the strict liability rule.
163
 One rationale for 
strict products liability is that sellers are often in a better position than 
consumers to identify product risks and defects, so this factor weighs 
against strict products liability where such rationale does not apply.
164
 
Factor (1) takes into account the seller’s experience to determine whether 
the seller really was in the best position in the particular case at bar. Factor 
(2) essentially incorporates a flexible “occasional seller” doctrine. The 
court should look at both the number of units and the amount of revenue to 
consider whether the seller is an occasional seller. A seller of more 
expensive products may sell less units because there are less buyers in the 
 
 
 162. See Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and Its 
Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 390 (2004) (explaining that “the fact that the line is inevitably arbitrary, 
in the sense that the line drawn balances the competing interests so well that the line could just as well 
have been drawn slightly to one side or the other, does not justify drawing a line that is entirely 
arbitrary”). 
 163. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 70.  
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market, but the number and amount components account for that 
difference. Two other rationales for strict products liability are that sellers 
can absorb or spread the costs of product accidents and that the seller 
should bear the cost as a business expense.
165
 Factor (3) considers the 
seller’s ability to actually spread the costs or buy insurance. This factor 
relates to Factor (2); however, Factor (3) is different because it accounts 
for the seller’s other product lines. If the seller’s business is smaller, it will 
face greater difficulty spreading the costs or buying insurance.
166
 Factor 
(4) seeks to encourage innovation where it is socially beneficial. This 
factor asks courts to make a difficult judgment call and, accordingly, 
should be judged neutral unless the product is overwhelmingly beneficial 
or detrimental to society. Factor (5) seeks to avoid potential issues with 
sellers trying to “game” the system. It is foreseeable that, as a result of this 
rule, sellers may try to keep their number and amount of sales below a 
certain level in order to avoid liability or intentionally ignore defects in 
their products. This defense, however, is really intended for the small-time 
seller who does not realize he is “in the business” and that he should 
perform quality checks or buy liability insurance. Factor (5) is an attempt 
to limit this defense to that type of individual. 
Moreover, while courts should employ a relatively high threshold for 
the seller to establish this defense—ensuring that it only applies to those 
small-scale designers and manufacturers who, in fairness, should not bear 
the burden of strict liability—the precise standard is likely insignificant.167 
Even if the seller successfully demonstrates that this affirmative defense 
applies to him or her, he could still be held liable under another products 
liability theory, such as negligence or breach of warranty.
168
  
There are several advantages to the micro-seller affirmative defense. 
First, it succeeds in placing the burden of strict liability only on those 
defendants who can adequately absorb and spread the losses and monitor 
 
 
165. Owen, supra note 91. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 70, 92, 133. 
 167. While the micro-seller defense shares some similarities with the occasional seller doctrine, an 
important difference is that the seller has the burden to prove he is a micro-seller. On the other hand, 
the occasional seller doctrine dictates that the plaintiff must prove the seller is “in the business of 
selling.” The particular allocation of the burden of proof is a crucial safeguard in the micro-seller 
defense to ensure that this defense is only available to a limited group of defendants.  
 168. Ideally, an individual who improperly escapes strict products liability would still be held 
liable under a negligence or breach of warranty theory. The availability of digital evidence associated 
with 3-D printed products should mitigate the potential for individuals to improperly avoid liability 
under all legal theories for sale of a defective product. In addition, Factor (5) of the micro-seller 
affirmative defense should safeguard against the defense’s abuse. As a result, while a high standard of 
proof is advisable, the amount of sellers who would improperly slip by under a lower standard is likely 
negligible. 
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for defects. Second, it encourages most sellers, including those who are 
borderline “micro-sellers” to buy insurance.169 Third, it encourages sellers 
to act in good faith in designing, producing, and advertising their products. 
Fourth, it grants courts some flexibility in applying strict liability to 
products that are especially beneficial. Fifth, this doctrine encourages 
innovation, at least more so than strict products liability alone. Finally, and 
perhaps controversially, it places some burden on individuals to inspect 
what they are buying. In the modern era, it is easy to research products on 
the Internet. Where the individual chooses a less reputable, cheaper 
generic product over a brand name design or product, it is not entirely 
unfair to impose some risk on the individual. 
On the other hand, this proposal is not immune to criticism. Because of 
the holistic approach, it is somewhat inconsistent with the goal of creating 
a uniform and predictable system. It does not encourage sellers to take 
precautions and inspect for defects to the same extent as strict products 
liability, although it does so more than negligence theory.
170
 And along 
with these disadvantages, it may make it difficult for consumers to rely on 
3-D designs and printed products because they do not have the same 
assurance that their injuries will be remedied.
171
 Critics may also be 
concerned about whether this defense will apply to all “at-home” 
manufacturers and not merely individual 3-D printing manufacturers. For 
years, individuals have manufactured jewelry, wooden furniture, and 
various other products in their homes, and have been subject to strict 
products liability.  
This is not, however, a detriment of the micro-seller doctrine. The same 
policy reasons underlying the micro-seller affirmative defense apply to 
these types of individual manufacturers as well. While this issue has 
 
 
 169. Although the unpredictability of the “micro-seller” defense may be criticized, the uncertainty 
also operates to encourage those sellers on the cusp to buy insurance to protect against liability. Some 
sellers may decide to purchase insurance to protect against negligence liability as well. Moreover, this 
approach is less ambiguous than the current “occasional seller” doctrine because it does articulate 
factors to give the court greater guidance. See supra note 57. 
 170. It should be noted, however, that law and economics literature suggests that negligence and 
strict liability provide similar precautionary incentives. Hylton, supra note 157, at 2463–64. “In other 
words, if one is deciding how much care to take in some activity, such as driving, the level of care that 
would be privately optimal would be the same whether the law imposes strict liability or negligence.” 
Id. 
 171. As discussed above, consumers have greater difficulty meeting their burden of proof in 
negligence actions and their recovery is much less certain. Accordingly, consumers may avoid 3-D 
printed products because they have a lower likelihood of recovering damages for injuries suffered due 
to defects in 3-D printed products compared with other products. See supra note 160. However, this 
effect may be mitigated in part by the increased availability of evidence in the form of digital designs. 
See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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become more pressing in light of 3-D printing and the ability to 
manufacture a wider range of products in one’s home, individual 
manufacturers have historically been prejudiced by the strict products 
liability doctrine. In fact, the micro-seller affirmative defense would 
improve fairness for these sorts of transactions. 
In spite of these disadvantages, the micro-seller affirmative defense 
will best address the policy inconsistencies triggered by the rise of 3-D 
printing. The defense effectively balances the desire to promote innovation 
with safety for consumers. Although this framework would only apply to 
the small group of sellers that fall into this “micro-seller” category, 
analysts anticipate significant growth in this category as 3-D printing 
expands beyond the hobbyist niche market.
172
 As 3-D printers become 
more popular and individuals become manufacturers in their own homes, 
products liability law must account for the “ordinary” American seller. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The personal 3-D printer market is growing at an exceptional pace. By 
enabling individuals to become manufacturers and sellers of sophisticated 
products, this new technology gives rise to novel issues in products 
liability law. Unlike commercial sellers, these individuals lack the 
expertise and resources to adequately inspect for and prevent defects in 
their products. Moreover, unlike their commercial counterparts, these 
individuals lack leverage over their buyers in price and warranty 
negotiations. Thus, buyers are in a much stronger position to negotiate for 
better terms of sale. As a result, the strict product theory of liability is too 
burdensome for these individuals and the risk deters them from developing 
new, potentially beneficial products. To counteract these ramifications, we 
should provide individual sellers with a “micro-seller” affirmative defense. 
Under this defense, the court will evaluate five factors to determine 
whether, in fairness, the seller should be subject to strict liability for the 
defective product. The micro-seller defense contemplates the modern 
marketplace of 3-D printed products and designs and addresses the policy 
inconsistencies resulting from personal 3-D printing. While it levels the 
legal landscape for sellers, the defense does not entirely eradicate recourse 
for consumers, who may still succeed on negligence or breach of warranty 
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claims. 3-D printing offers immense opportunities for innovation and 
societal growth. In turn, the micro-seller affirmative defense strikes the 
balance between promoting such innovation and encouraging consumer 
safety.  
Nicole D. Berkowitz
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